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First responders, including firefighters, police officers, emergency medical 
service workers, and disaster clean-up teams, are often the forgotten victims of disaster 
response and recovery, suffering higher injury and illness rates than other population 
groups. Hampered by limited data collection from past disasters and few existing disaster 
response injury studies, this thesis examined disaster response case studies to illuminate 
responder injury and illness issues. Recommendations to reduce injuries and improve 
responder safety include better training before a disaster, proper use of personnel 
protective equipment, and strict enforcement of existing policies, rules, and laws at the 
scene of a disaster. 
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This thesis analyzed rates of injury among disaster responders, and examined 
how laws, rules, and procedures facilitate responder safety during disaster response. 
Disaster responders are not only the traditional first responders, such as fire, police, 
and EMS, but also include incident management and skilled support personnel such as 
ironworkers, operating engineers, laborers, cleanup workers, and volunteers.  
Results of data analyzed show that injury rates for disaster responders are 
elevated when compared to national averages, as well as when compared to injury 
rates for first responders in general. The research finds considerable room both for 
additional research on injury and illness rates in disaster response and 
improvement in oversight and enforcement of safety standards. Recommendations 
discussed include: 
• improved data collection of injury rates in disaster responses
• enforcement of existing safety policies
• improved risk surveillance
• ensured adequate staffing
• improved training for skilled support personnel
This thesis research was limited by poor record keeping during disasters, 
fragmentation of existing data across different levels of government, and limited 
existing studies into the area. 
 xvi 




This thesis examines the safety of responders during a disaster response. When 
posing questions about responder safety in disasters, it is important to illuminate what is 
included in the realm of responders as well as disasters. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) identifies a disaster as “an event that exceeds the capacity 
of the affected area to respond to it in such a way as to save lives; to preserve property; 
and to maintain the social, ecological, economic, and political stability of the affected 
region.”1  
In post-disaster situations, responders are not only the traditional first 
responders, such as fire, police, and emergency medical service, but also 
include incident management and skilled support personnel such as ironworkers, 
operating engineers, laborers, cleanup workers, and volunteers.2 For this 
investigation, the concept of “safety” includes physical injury, illness, and disease to 
responders that result from participation in a disaster response.   
The health of responders is a critical part of disaster response. In addition to 
meeting legal requirements, ensuring the health and safety of responders minimizes 
costs incurred due to injury and allows responders to physically perform their assigned 
duties. Studies of past disasters indicate a pattern of illness and injury among 
responders. Similar physical injuries and health issues are present among responders 
to September 11, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy, and other disasters.3 The intent 
of this research is to analyze injury and safety in past responses (and the effects they 
have on responders); determine what, if any, common threads exist; and propose 
recommendations for action. 
1 FEMA, “Theory, Principles, and Fundamentals of Hazards, Disasters, and U.S. Emergency 
Management: Defining Disaster,” Emergency Management Institute course, accessed February 10, 2017. 
https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/aemrc/courses/coursesunderdev/hazdisusems.aspx. 
2 Joy C. Lee Pearson and Deborah Weinstock, “Minimizing Safety and Health Impacts at Disaster 
Sites: The Need for Comprehensive Worker Safety and Health Training Based on an Analysis of National 
Disasters in the U.S,” Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management 8, no. 1 (2011): 1–16. 
3 Ibid. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question is: How can laws, rules and procedures facilitate 
responder safety during disaster response?  
B. RESEARCH DESIGN: MULTI-GOAL ANALYSIS 
There are already numerous existing policies for responder safety both generally, 
and specifically in disasters. A policy analysis focuses on understanding the current 
policy. It involves in-depth analysis of existing policies, identifying their strengths and 
weakness, and results in recommendations for changes. Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) rules and regulations make up the framework of the existing 
general policy while the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) Worker 
Safety and Health Support Annex to the National Response Framework forms the base 
for safety policy specifically in disasters. In addition to these federal policies, there are 
numerous industry, local, and state laws, regulations, and policies. However, given the 
high number of agencies with responder responsibilities, the majority of local policies are 
not reviewed nor considered in this thesis; instead, the national policies are of primary 
concern. 
To better quantify the problem and measure possible solutions, a quantitative 
analysis of existing injury and illness rates provides an ideal baseline for effective 
analysis. Coupled with the policy analysis, a multi-goal analysis of policy effectiveness 
will help to identify gaps or problems with existing implementation of safety policies. 
1. Limitations and Scope 
This research faced several limitations. While it is the intent of this analysis to 
help eliminate injury and illness among responders, attaining an injury-free workplace 
in any work environment is nearly impossible; so, instead, this thesis focuses on 
reducing the rates of injury or illness. Additionally, limited information is available, 
especially in light of poor record-keeping and the infrequency of events that garner 
widespread deployment of resources to disasters. As a result, it is not possible to include 
a broad scope of disaster events; instead, the focus is on the most impactful events.  
 3 
The scope of this thesis is limited to physical illnesses and injuries. While mental 
health is important to the overall health of responders, including mental health issues as 
part of this analysis would drastically broaden the scope. Additionally, mental health 
issues often cannot be tied to a particular event and may not present until later in life, 
making it difficult to target the specific cause. Furthermore, there is much existing 
literature on mental health issues. This thesis focuses, instead, on physical injuries, for 
which the cause and correlation can be clearly established, and for which there is a 
greater need for further research. 
The review focuses on responder safety in the United States. Aggregate data from 
presidential disaster declarations reveals that, in general, the most impactful disasters, as 
measured by their cost, are man-made disasters, severe storms, hurricanes, floods, and 
earthquakes.4 Additionally, in selecting events for analysis, the availability of injury and 
illness data must also be considered. Resultantly, the events of primary concern are the 
Oklahoma City Bombing, September 11, Hurricane Katrina, and Deepwater Horizon.  
2. Data Sources 
There is a substantial amount of material about the effects of disasters on 
responders, as well as on the need to provide better resources and care for responders, 
especially surrounding the events of September 11, Hurricane Katrina, and many other 
post-September 11 events. For the events of September 11, especially, there has been 
systematic tracking and follow-up with responders through organizations such as the 
World Trade Center (WTC) Heath Registry, which provides a high level of detailed data 
and analysis on the health of responders. To identify breakdowns in the safety systems, 
after action reviews from various events proved to be invaluable.  
                                                 
4 Gregory van der Vink et al., “The Increasing Costs of U.S. Natural Disasters,” Geotimes (November, 
2005), 25. 
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3. Mode of Analysis 
The mode of analysis used in this thesis, described in this section, is adapted from 
Eugene Bardach’s A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis.5 
(1) Step 1: Defining the Problem 
The first step is to clearly identify that there is a problem. This is 
accomplished by a quantitative analysis of existing injury and illness rates based on 
previous research and injury data collected from various sources, including Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports, occupational injury data, and published medical 
research.  
Step 1A: General Injury Rates: In order to perform a quantitative analysis, there 
must be a baseline for comparison of the data. To form this baseline, the workplace injury 
and illness statistics maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor for general employment 
in the United States are used. This analysis allows injury rates to be compared to the 
average injury rate for American workers. 
Step 1B: Disaster Case Studies: During the course of research, it was determined 
that there was no single consolidated set of data with which to quantify responder injuries 
and illness in disasters. Instead, the data was segmented, primarily by event and often by 
occupation as well. Several specific disasters were selected based on the amount of data 
available and the impact of the events. These events are analyzed and the injury and 
illness rate quantified in a comparable format to the general injury rates. 
(2) Step 2: Establishing Goals 
Once the prevalence of injuries is established, based on the injury rates 
discovered in step one, an in-depth analysis of existing research is needed. If the 
existing rules are intended to prevent common injuries, what caused the rules to fail? 
How can policy improve the safety of responders during a disaster response, and what is 
an appropriate goal for reduction? 
                                                 
5 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, fourth ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 
2012). 
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(3) Step 3: Selecting a Policy 
Once policy gaps have been identified, an analysis of those gaps determines what 
measures can be taken to prevent injuries in the future (either by adjusting the 
implementation of existing rules or by recommending new ones). This analysis examines 
possible barriers to implementation such as cost and practicality, as well as any impact of 
a hindrance on the response operations. These recommendations come from existing 
unimplemented recommendations, best practices, and developing research.   
(4) Step 4: Valuing and Evaluating the Suggested Policy 
Once a policy adjustment has been determined, the likely effects of the 
modification must also be determined, if possible. Comparisons of implementation in 
pilot programs, limited events, and other fields are used as a baseline to determine the 
effects. Those results are then compared against the goals to determine the best policy 
alternative. 
4. Output 
This research culminates with a set of recommendations for improving the safety 
of responders based on new or enhanced applications of existing procedures, or 
modification of existing policies.  
  
 6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The information included in this literature review was collected from research 
conducted between September 2014 and February 2016. The research was primarily 
conducted through research databases provided by the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Dudley Knox Library, including databases such as EBSCO, JSTOR, ProQuest, and 
WorldCat. Searches were conducted using a series of systematic keywords designed to 
catch a wide breadth of material. Some additional information was also collected from 
wider searches using Google Scholar, as well as referrals to material provided by 
colleagues.  
The purpose of this review is to summarize the existing literature on responder 
safety in disasters, identify gaps in the information, and identify areas that require further 
inquiry and research. An initial overview of the sources indicates numerous gaps in 
available data. While there is substantial written material about health-related disaster 
effects on responders surrounding the events of September 11, there is very little related 
literature predating 2001. Additionally, much of the research identifies areas of concern 
but fails to outline clear recommendations or solutions. Consequently, there remains 
substantial room for additional research and inquiry on the subject. 
A. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
OSHA has published various standards that apply to disaster response.6 Even a 
simple list of these standards would occupy several pages. The requirements cover 
everything from workplace safety features, to safeguards required for specific tasks 
(such as firefighting, iron working, debris removal, etc.), to standard protection 
equipment for responders.  
OSHA standards require training for covered employees. Generally speaking, 
for responders, this includes hazard communication, respiratory protection, personal 
protective equipment, blood-borne pathogens, and hazardous waste operations and 
                                                 
6 Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910. 
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emergency response.7 However, research conducted by Pearson and Weinstock in 
2011 indicated that this training is often not provided to skilled support personnel, as 
they do not fall into the first responder category.8 Pearson and Weinstock also explain 
that provision of training and equipment before a disaster event has been identified 
numerous times as paramount to workers’ ability to efficiently and safely respond to 
disasters.9 The GAO has found that responders proceeding with missing or incomplete 
equipment are more likely to suffer from injuries or illness that will prevent them from 
continuing to perform their duties.10 Proper equipment is paramount to responders and 
has been identified as a needed action since at least the WTC response. 
However, GAO reports also show that, while these standards are critical to 
providing protection to workers, OSHA has temporarily suspended enforcement 
following many recent disasters in heavily impacted areas with the goal of expediting 
recovery.11 OSHA continues to make this decision so as not to hamper rescue efforts, 
instead providing technical assistance to responders in lieu of formal enforcement 
action.12 
B. DISASTER DATA 
Data sources for specific disasters are infrequently available and difficult to 
locate. As a result, the events chosen for analysis are based primarily on the availability 
of data. These events tended to be the most familiar ones, and were likely widely 
researched due to the extensive public attention they received at the time. 
                                                 
7 Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Principal Emergency Response and 
Preparedness Requirements and Guidance (OSHA 3122-06R) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2004), http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3122.pdf.  
8 Pearson and Weinstock, “Minimizing Safety and Health Impacts at Disaster Sites.” 
9 Ibid. 
10 Cynthia Bascetta, September 11: HHS Needs to Ensure the Availability of Health Screening and 
Monitoring for all Responders (GAO-07-892) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2007).  
11 Katherine Torres, “Legislators Question Enforcement Suspension after Disasters,” EHS Today, July 
7, 2006, http://ehstoday.com/news/ehs_imp_38319.  
12 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning would Improve 
OSHA’s Efforts to Protect Workers’ Safety and Health in Disasters (GAO-07-193) (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2007).  
 9 
One of the earliest studies into the impact of disasters on responders is for the 
Oklahoma City bombing. The event had substantial interest at the time, including some 
interest among the medical community; a study on responder safety was subsequently 
published in the American Journal of Industrial Medicine.13 The study revealed 
systematic poor tracking of injuries by responders as well as a number of injuries that 
could have been prevented with proper training or personal protection equipment.14 
The most extensive amount of literature about responder safety surrounds the 
events of the WTC tragedy. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, disaster response 
workers reported a broad range of injuries and illnesses, from minor sprains to acute 
respiratory and mental health illnesses.15 The most prevalent and sustained illness 
among the estimated 60,000 to 70,000 responders was respiratory illness, with at least 
6,500 responders suffering from significant or worsened respiratory symptoms.16 
Numerous organizations have been set up to provide medical surveillance of the WTC 
responders over the long term. The largest of those is the World Trade Center Worker 
and Volunteer Medical Screening Program, which has 7,810 participants.17 The literature 
surrounding this surveillance is substantial; it has played a prominent role in revisions to 
responder safety guidance for disasters, especially as it relates to the provision of 
personal protective equipment.18  
Due to the extensive effects of Hurricane Katrina (and Hurricane Rita, which 
impacted the Atlantic two weeks later and is often grouped with Katrina), there was 
substantial interest in the event. As a result, there are a number of sources of 
information, from GAO reports to independent research.  
                                                 
13 Ann M. Dellinger, Richard J. Waxweiler, and Sue Mallonee, “Injuries to Rescue Workers 
Following the Oklahoma City Bombing,” American Journal of Industrial Medicine 31, no. 6 (1997): 727–
732. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Pearson and Weinstock, “Minimizing Safety and Health Impacts at Disaster Sites.” 
16 Bob Weinhold, “Emergency Responder Health: What have we Learned from Past Disasters?” 
Environmental Health Perspectives 118, no. 8 (2010): 348.  
17 K. R. Perritt et al., “Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses Reported by World Trade Center Response 
Workers and Volunteers,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 26, no. 06 (March, 2012): 401–407, doi: 
10.1017/S1049023X12000143. 
18 GAO, Disaster Preparedness. 
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During the Deepwater Horizon Gulf oil spill, substantial attention was paid to 
medical surveillance of the responders. The most common injuries during the response 
were lacerations, sprains, and contusions; however, the long-term health effects are still 
unclear.19 Since the end of the response, the National Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences has made a concerted effort to monitor response workers. However, the initial 
results of the medical surveillance will not be available until at least 2018. 
There has also been significant interest in the occupational health impacts of 
responders following Hurricane Sandy. Because much of that analysis is still ongoing, 
however, the data has not yet been published.20 Available data can be found in 
investigatory reports from local news agencies and some limited government reporting. 
C. GENERAL INJURY RATES  
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) compiles an annual report on workplace 
injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. This report includes a breakdown of injury rates by 
industry, occupation, and geographic location, as well as some analysis of unusually high 
rates or large numbers of injuries within certain occupations.21 The analysis includes an 
additional breakdown by the cause and source of the injury if it involves one or more 
days away from work.22 This data plays a fundamental role in establishing an average 
national injury rate for occupations, and is analyzed in depth in Chapter III: Injury Rates. 
However, BLS statistics do not go into event-specific details. 
Additional research has also been conducted to expand upon BLS statistics in 
specific occupational areas. Emergency responders (generally defined as first responders) 
have been an area of curiosity and several reports analyze surveillance data on injury 
                                                 
19 “NIOSH Report of Deepwater Horizon Response/BP Illness and Injury Data (April 23 – July 8, 
2010),” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), July 27, 2010, 8, 
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/oilspillresponse/pdfs/NIOSHrot-BPilnessAndInjuryDataApril23-July8-
2010.pdf. 
20 Michael J. Reilly, “Impact of Health Department Worker Safety Training on Health Impacts after 
Sandy,” National Institutes of Health, August 10, 2015, http://grantome.com/grant/NIH/U01-OH010625-
01S1. 




rates among first responders in general. RAND produced an extremely detailed analysis 
in 2004 on emergency responder injuries and fatalities, which found that the fatality rate 
for both police and firefighters was approximately three times that of the general 
population.23 This research aligns with other studies, including a 2010 study published in 
the American Journal of Industrial Medicine.24  
Overall, there is little data on physical injuries to responders, most of the research 
is scattered, and there is little consolidated research on the matter. There have been only a 
few controlled studies conducted on disaster responder populations, with much of the 
existing research gleaned from reports and analyses conducted after the events.25 As a 
result, most research sources agree that disaster responders are “faced with poorly 
characterized risk and unknown short and long-term health consequences.”26 
  
                                                 
23 Ari Houser et al., Emergency Responder Injuries and Fatalities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 
xv. 
24 Audrey A. Reichard and Larry L. Jackson, “Occupational Injuries among Emergency Responders,” 
American Journal of Industrial Medicine 53, no. 1 (2010): 1–11. 
25 Jennifer A. Rusiecki et al., “Disaster-Related Exposures and Health Effects among U.S. Coast 
Guard Responders to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita A Cross-Sectional Study,” Journal of Occupational and 
Environmental Medicine 56, no. 8 (August 2014): 828, doi:10.1097/JOM.0000000000000188. 
26 Ibid., 829; Heidi Swygard and Renae E. Stafford, “Effects on Health of Volunteers Deployed during 
a Disaster,” The American Surgeon 75, no. 9 (September, 2009): 747. 
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III. INJURY RATES 
To determine if disaster responders face an increased risk of illness, there must 
first be a baseline for comparison. Three sets of data have been analyzed to provide a 
comparison: injury rates among the general working population; injury rates among 
traditional first responders (fire, police, and paramedics) in their normal roles; and injury 
rates among disaster responders. 
The main sources of the base data come from three different types of sources that 
provide data on occupational hazards, injuries, and illnesses faced by responders: 
occupation-specific sources, event-specific sources, and general population data. 
• Occupation-specific sources are limited to a particular subset of one 
occupation or group of related occupations. The collected data focuses on 
the specific issues and hazards facing that specific occupation; as a result, 
the data can be highly detailed and formatted to address a particular 
concern. 
• Event-specific sources are collected as the result of a particular event. The 
data requirements and scope of the collection varies, but generally will 
cover the subset of occupations participating in the incident. 
• General population data provides standardized data in a common format, 
but only breaks reporting down by occupation and not by participation in a 
particular event. So, while useful in determining a baseline for 
comparison, it cannot provide injury rates of those participating in a given 
event. 
Various government and non-government organizations track injuries and 
fatalities; the level and detail of this tracking varies between sources. To provide a 
standard for comparison, these statistics have been summarized into specific categories of 
injury. To account for varying datasets and differing sample sizes, this analysis uses the 
incidence rate as the basis for comparison. The incidence rate is the primary statistic 
utilized by the BLS for comparison of injury rates across industries. It is defined as the 
annualized number of injuries per 100 workers.27 Furthermore, since data collected from 
different sources will have a range of reporting periods, every effort is made to compare 
                                                 
27 “Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities.” Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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rate between similar reporting periods, and any discrepancies between timeframes are 
noted. 
Additionally, there are a number of studies based either directly on collected 
injury data, or that examine specific occurrences of injuries in disasters. Several of these 
studies examined the effectiveness of safety measures and policies, and reviewed 
compliance rates with polices, including identifying why employees failed to comply; 
these studies provide important insight into injury rates and are thus incorporated into the 
discussion. 
A. INJURY RATES AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION 
The primary data source available for injury rates among the general population 
comes from the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) and the Census of 
Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) collected by the BLS and published each year.28 The 
SOII is the most comprehensive catalog of occupational injuries and illness in the United 
States. It provides information on work-related injuries, illnesses, and the rate at which 
they occur for a broad range of industries, employees, and injury types. The SOII covers 
a sample of over 230,000 private industry establishments as well as select state and local 
governments. Due to statutory jurisdictional limits imposed on OSHA, self-employed 
individuals, federal government employees, and employees of the United States Postal 
Services are excluded from the SOII data.29 The CFOI is an extensive catalog of fatal 
workplace injuries in the United States covering private industry and local, state, and 
federal government employees. The BLS uses multiple sources to verify each fatal injury 
and determine if it is a work-related nexus, and to collect information on the cause and 
circumstances of the injury and the employee’s characteristics.30 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 “Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses,” CDC, accessed January 12, 2016, 
http://wwwn.cdc.gov/niosh-survapps/gateway/Database.aspx?id=28; Ryan Sutter and Kristina Schafer, 
Characteristics of Individuals and Employment among First Responders (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2015). 
30 “Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI),” Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed January 12, 
2016, http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshfat1.htm. 
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The SOII data for 2014, the most recent year for which it was available, 
represented 3.0 million nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses, with an incidence rate 
of 3.2 cases per 100 workers.31 Furthermore, the data collected over the past ten years 
(shown in Figure 1) demonstrates a general trend of decreasing injury rates among 
employees, with the average incidence rate decreasing from 4.8 in 2004 to 3.2 in 2014.32  
 
Figure 1.  Nonfatal Occupational Injury and Illness Incidence Rates 
by Case Type, 2003–201433 
These rates are similar across most industries; however, there is a noticeably 
higher rate among state and local governments (see Table 1), with approximately 47 
percent more injuries than the general population.34 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses—2014 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 2015). 
33 Adapted from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses, 
Chart 1. 
34 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses. 
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All Industries 3.4 1.8 
  Private Industry 3.2 1.7 
  Goods-Producing 3.8 2.2 
  Construction 3.6 2.0 
  Manufacturing 4.0 2.2 
  Service-Providing 3.0 1.6 
  Education and Health Services 4.2 2.0 
  State and Local Government 5.0 2.3 
Incidence rates of nonfatal occupational injuries by select North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) sectors. 
 
B. INJURY RATES AMONG FIRST RESPONDERS 
Although the focus of this thesis is on the larger disaster responder community, 
the first responder daily workplace represents the closest comparison to the conditions 
experienced by disaster responders, with first responders experiencing a variable and 
strong hazard environment in their day-to-day work activities.36 Past studies have 
indicated that the physical demands of response may be the leading cause of injuries 
among first responders, and as such it is prudent to compare injury rates among disaster 
responders to not only the general population but also to this subset of the general 
population with similar occupational demands.37 
Several past studies have focused on occupational injuries among first responders, 
which includes police, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians (EMTs).38 These 
studies have found that both occupational injury and fatalities are approximately three 
                                                 
35 Adapted from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses 
Table 1. 
36 Houser et al., Emergency Responder Injuries and Fatalities, xv. 
37 Reichard and Jackson, Occupational Injuries among Emergency Responders, 1. 
38 Ibid.; Houser et al., Emergency Responder Injuries and Fatalities. 
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times more prevalent among first responders, and that sprains, contusions, and lacerations 
are the three most common types of injury.39 
The BLS does collect some information on first responders in their SOII; 
however, data on state and local government employees is only collected from select 
states, and only since 2008 (the number of participating states has steadily increased since 
the Bureau started to keep track).40 In 2014, the SOII included data from state and local 
government employees in 41 states (see Table 2). The incidence rates for the three 
subgroups ranged from 7.9 to 12.1.41 










All Industries 3.4 1.8 
  
 
Ambulance Services 7.9 5.0 
  State and Local Government 5 2.3 
  
 
Justice, Public Order, Safety 9.5 4.8 
  
  
Police Protection 10.6 5.0 
      Fire Protection 12.1 7.6 
Incidence rates of nonfatal occupational injuries for ambulance, police, and fire 
services and their North American Industry Classification System (NASICS) 
sectors. 
  
                                                 
39 Houser et al., Emergency Responder Injuries and Fatalities, 32, 51; Reichard and Jackson, 
Occupational Injuries among Emergency Responders, 7. 
40 Shannon M. Maloney, “Nonfatal Injuries and Illnesses among State and Local Government 
Workers, Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 2014, https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2014/soii-gov-
workers/home.htm. 
41 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses. 
42 Adapted from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses, 
Table 1. 
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Additionally, the data collected over the past six years (see Figure 2 and Figure 
3), demonstrate a general trend of decreasing injury rates among first responders, but 
with less of a clear trend when compared to the general population and state and local 
government employees in general.43 
 
Figure 2.  Total Incidence Rate among First Responder Categories, 2008–201444 
  
                                                 
43 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses. 




Incidence rates of nonfatal injuries resulting in days away from work, transfer, or restriction. 
Figure 3.  Days away from Work Rate among First Responder Categories, 
2008–201445 
In 2004, RAND published a study entitled Emergency Responder Injuries and 
Fatalities: An Analysis of Surveillance Data, which quantified injury data from various 
sources on first responders, including the National Fire Protection Association, U.S. Fire 
Administration, National Fire Incident Reporting System, National Law Enforcement 
Officer Memorial Fund Database, and National EMS Memorial Service Database.46 
Their analysis focused heavily on firefighter injuries, for which the largest amount of data 
was available. Based on their analysis, the average incidence rate for firefighters between 
1995 and 2000 was 8.0 cases per 100 workers.47 
In 2010, a follow-up report published in the American Journal of Industrial 
Medicine corroborated these rates based on the National Electronic Injury Surveillance 
system for injuries treated in hospital emergency departments. The study found that 
police and firefighters had injury incidence rates of 8.5 and 7.4 injuries per 100 workers, 
respectively.48  
                                                 
45 Adapted from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses, 
Table 1. 
46 Houser et al., Emergency Responder Injuries and Fatalities, 13–23. 
47 Incidence rate was determined by dividing the count of reported non-fatal injuries (87,900) by the 
included population (1,100,000). Ibid., 37, 53. 
48 Reichard and Jackson, Occupational Injuries among Emergency Responders, 1–11. 
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C. INJURY RATES AMONG RESPONDERS IN DISASTERS 
Injury data among responders in disasters is generally limited to event-specific 
data collection. Events were selected for inclusion if the event exceeded the capacity of 
local and state governments, and had available data on occupational injuries among 
responders; as a result, all selected events included local, state, and federal response 
components. For each selected event, a brief description of the nature of the event is 
provided, as is a summary of the responder safety issues, the injury rates for responders 
(or a subset of responders, depending on availability), and the estimated annualized rate 
of injury.  
1. Oklahoma City Bombing 
The Oklahoma City bombing occurred on April 19, 1995, after a truck bomb 
exploded at a federal building in downtown Oklahoma City.49 Rescue and recovery 
operations continued through May 4, 1995; approximately 12,000 responders participated 
in rescue operations.50  
Shortly after the onset of the disaster, the Oklahoma City Fire Department 
(OCFD) established safety officers to monitor responders, the damaged building, and the 
overall site.51 Nevertheless, there was no standard form for reporting injuries during the 
recovery.52 Following the recovery efforts, there was some interest among the medical 
community on responder safety, and a subsequent study was published in the American 
Journal of Industrial Medicine. The study reviewed medical records from hospital 
emergency departments and specialty clinics and calculated estimated injury rates (see 
Table 3) among the two largest group of responders, the OCFD and the FEMA Urban 
Search and Rescue Teams (USAR). 
                                                 
49 U.S. Department of Justice, Responding to Terrorism Victims: Oklahoma City and Beyond (NCJ 
183949) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000), Chapter II. 
50 BP, “Deepwater Horizon Incident Response Recordable Injury & Illness Data,” OSHA, accessed 
February 10, 2017, https://www.osha.gov/oilspills/DeepwaterData.pdf. 
51 Dellinger, Waxweiler, and Mallonee, “Injuries to Rescue Workers,” 730. 
52 Ibid. 
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Table 3.   Oklahoma City Bombing Responder Injury Rates53 







OCFD 28 932 0.0015 13.14 
USAR 68 658 0.0012 10.51 
Combined 96 1590 0.0014 12.05 
 
The estimated annualized injury rate among responders in the Oklahoma City 
bombing was 12.05; the most common injuries were sprains, lacerations, and eye injuries 
(see Figure 4). The study determined that at least two types of injuries were preventable: 
both chemical burns and foot injuries could have been reduced with proper training and 
better logistics support, respectively.54 Additionally, the study postulated that eye injuries 
may have been preventable, but that there was insufficient data to make a definitive 
conclusion.55 
                                                 
53 Adapted from Dellinger, Waxweiler, and Mallonee, “Injuries to Rescue Workers,” 729. Annualized 
rate calculated by adjusting the studies determined injuries per hour rate to an annual rate of injury. 
Combined rates determined using a weighted average of both agencies. 




Figure 4.  Oklahoma City Bombing Reported Injury Types56 
2. World Trade Center 
The World Trade Center attack occurred on September 11, 2001, when two 
hijacked planes crashed into the WTC’s north and south towers, leading to their eventual 
collapse later that day. An estimated 40,000 responders worked at Ground Zero for the 
subsequent nine-month recovery, conducting rescue operations, service restoration, and 
debris cleanup.57  
In the initial weeks, there was no unified occupational health screening or 
reporting for responders.58 However, starting in 2002, WTC responders began to receive 
some of the most comprehensive occupational health screening and tracking programs. 
One of these, the World Trade Center Worker and Volunteer Medical Screening 
Program, performed an extensive survey of responders. Of the 7,810 participants, 2,486 
                                                 
56 Adapted from Dellinger, Waxweiler and Mallonee, “Injuries to Rescue Workers,” 729, Table 1. 
57 Robin Herbert et al., “The World Trade Center Disaster and the Health of Workers: Five-Year 
Assessment of a Unique Medical Screening Program,” Environmental Health Perspectives 114, no. 12 
(December, 2006): 1853. 
58 Ibid., 1854. 
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reported at least one injury or illness requiring medical treatment during the recovery (see 
Table 4).59 











Construction 2,623  806  30.7 41.0 
Law Enforcement 2,036  675  33.2 44.2 
Other 2,892  911  31.5 42.0 
Unknown 259  94  36.3 48.4 
Total 7,810  2,486  31.8 42.4 
Injury and illness cases and incidence rate, and an annualized rate based on the nine-month recovery 
period. 
 
The most common injuries were respiratory and traumatic injuries, such as 
lacerations, contusions, and punctures (see Figure 5).61 Many of the health effects, 
particularly the respiratory issues, persisted or worsened over time, often developing into 
chronic disorders that require long-term monitoring.62 
                                                 
59 Perritt et al., “Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses.” 
60 Adapted from Perritt et al., “Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses,” Table 1. 
61 Ibid., 401–407. 
62 Bascetta, September 11, 8. 
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Figure 5.  World Trade Center Injuries63 
Surveys of WTC responders indicated that improper (or absent) use of personal 
protective equipment (PPE), especially respiratory protection, may have been the 
primary cause of more than 25 percent of all injuries or illness for responders.64 While 
the initial problem was a simple equipment shortage, respiratory protection compliance 
still remained low after the equipment’s widespread availability.65 After the WTC 
response, OSHA recognized the need to ensure PPE availability before a future 
incident and incorporated it into the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex to the 
National Response Framework.   
  
                                                 
63 Adapted from Perritt et al., “Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses,” Table 2. 
64 William A. Groves et al., “Protecting First Responders: Analysis of PPE Guidelines Distributed at 
the World Trade Center and Pentagon Disaster Sites,” Professional Safety 49, no. 11 (November 1, 2004) 
65 Ibid., 40.  
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3. Hurricane Katrina 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast, causing 
widespread damage in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi.66 It is estimated that almost 
50,000 federal employees responded at the height of the events and tens of thousands 
more state and local responders responded as well.67  
During the event, there was no centralized or organized collection of injury data 
among recovery workers.68 Although OSHA was responsible for at least the federal 
workers under the “Worker Safety and Health Annex” to the National Response 
Framework, OSHA did not receive a mission assignment from FEMA to pay for 
activities, and federal agencies had not developed a process for the uniform collection of 
data in a disaster response.69  
The GAO conducted a review of worker safety and OSHA’s performance in 
Hurricane Katrina and published the data in 2007. During the GAO’s research, they 
requested that each of the ten federal agencies that responded submit data on worker 
injuries. However, only four of those agencies kept sufficient records to report on: the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE), the Coast Guard, and the Department of the Interior.70 While detailed injury 
data is available in published sources for each of these agencies, corresponding records 
detailing the total number of employees deployed to Katrina are not. To calculate the 
incident rate, the number of employees for each agency had to be estimated based on best 
available data, including news reports, government reports, and agency publications from 
the time. As a result, the incidence rates (see Table 5) for workers during Hurricane 
Katrina are at best a rough estimate. 
                                                 
66 GAO, Disaster Preparedness, 1. 
67 Ibid., 11. 
68 Ibid., 2. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 50–52. 
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Table 5.   Hurricane Katrina Federal Worker Incidence Rate71 
Agency Reported Period Months Injuries No. of Workers 
Annualized 
Incidence Rate 
EPA Aug 2005–Jun 2006 10 124 1,200 12.40 
USCAE Aug 2005–Jun 2007 10 562 3,100 21.75 
Coast Guard Nov 2005–Mar 2006 5 555 5,600 23.79 
Dept. of Interior Aug 2005–Apr 2006 8 90 2,304 5.86 
Overall Weighted Average: 18.77 
 
Of those four agencies, over 3,000 injuries and illness were reported.72 The most 
common injuries were from insect and animal bites; heat stress; and exposures to 
chemicals, infections or biological agents, floodwater, mold, and carbon monoxide.73 
Additionally, in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina responders reported cases of 
communicable diseases such as pneumonia, rashes, and sinus infections.74 Surveillance 
conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Louisiana 
Department of Health and Hospitals in the immediate aftermath of Katrina corroborate 
these types of injuries.75 They reviewed cases of injury treatment in New Orleans–area 
hospitals and clinic from September 8–October 14, 2005, and found that the most 
                                                 
71 Total injury counts, injury annualized incidence rate, and the number of EPA workers, based on 
GAO, Disaster Preparedness, Appendix II, 48–58; USACE no of workers based on deployed personnel 
reported in Mike Pfenning, “District Supports Hurricane Recovery; Hurricane Response Delays New 
Personnel System,” Crosscurrents 28, no. 9 (October 2005): 2; Coast Guard workers based on overall 
deployed personnel estimated by the GAO and reported in Rusiecki et al.“Disaster-Related Exposures and 
Health Effects, 822 and corroborated in “The U.S. Coast Guard & Hurricane Katrina,” U.S. Coast Guard, 
last modified December 21, 2016, http://www.uscg.mil/history/katrina/katrinaindex.asp; Department of 
Interior Workers based on deployed personnel reported in “Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,” U.S. Department 
of the Interior, last modified April 26, 2006, https://www.doi.gov/emergency/factsheets/hurricanes-katrina-
and-rita. 
72 GAO, Disaster Preparedness, 13–17. 
73 Ibid. 
74 CDC, “Infectious Disease and Dermatologic Conditions in Evacuees and Rescue Workers after 
Hurricane Katrina—Multiple States, August–September, 2005,” MMWR: Morbidity & Mortality Weekly 
Report 54, no. 38 (September 26, 2005): 961–964. 
75 Ernest E. Sullivent III et al., “Nonfatal Injuries Following Hurricane Katrina—New Orleans, 
Louisiana, 2005,” Journal of Safety Research 37, no. 2 (2006): 215–216. 
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common injuries among responders were lacerations, falls, struck by an object, and 
animal bites (see Figure 6).76 
 
Most common injury types among responders seeking assistance from medical facilities in 
New Orleans from September 8–October 14, 2005. 
Figure 6.  CDC Injury Surveillance after Hurricane Katrina77 
The CDC noted that injuries by toxic effects were much less common than the 
GAO found during their review, making up only 2.6 percent of injuries noted among 
responder seeking treatment in New Orleans hospitals.78 Unfortunately, injury rates 
cannot be established based on the CDC data, as there is insufficient information 
available to estimate the total count of responders in that particular area at the time of the 
surveillance.79  
The GAO found that the level of health and safety training and equipment 
provided in the Gulf area fell well below established federal standards.80 For example, 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 Adapted from Sullivent III et al., “Nonfatal Injuries Following Hurricane Katrina, 215, Table 2. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 GAO, Disaster Preparedness, 16 
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while utility workers were well trained on how to safely handle downed power lines, 
some were unaware of the need for additional PPE, such as boots with steel shanks to 
protect them from puncture wounds from debris containing nails and other sharp 
objects.81 
4. Deepwater Horizon 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill began on April 20, 2010, following the explosion 
and sinking of the BP oil rig of the same name.82 The explosion ruptured the oil well 
resulting in the unprecedented release of 4.9 million barrels of oil over 87 days until the 
well was capped on July 15, 2010.83 Approximately 55,000 workers responded to assist 
with the containment and cleanup of the oil spill.84  
During the response operation, OSHA, the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, and BP worked closely to ensure that injuries and illness were 
recorded in accordance with OSHA regulatory requirements.85 As a result, Deepwater 
Horizon has some of the most extensive injury records for a disaster of its magnitude. 
BP has made available the recordable injury and illness data from April 22, 2010, 
to July 12, 2010; this includes all responders except those employed by local, state, or 
federal government agencies.86 During this period, BP reported a total incidence rate of 
2.37 for the 91-day period (see Table 6).87 Annualized, this result is an incidence rate of 
9.5 injuries per 100 workers. 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 National Response Team, On Scene Coordinator Report on Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, 2011), 1. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Bernard D. Goldstein, Howard J. Osofsky, and Maureen Y. Lichtveld, “The Gulf Oil Spill,” New 
England Journal of Medicine 364, no. 14 (April, 2011): 1334–1348, doi: 10.1056/NEJMra1007197. 
85 CDC, “NIOSH Report of Deepwater Horizon Response/BP Illness and Injury Data.” 
86 BP. “Deepwater Horizon Incident Response Recordable Injury & Illness Data.” 
87 Ibid. 
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April 22 to July 12 (91 Days) 2.37 0.65 1.71 0.14 
Annualized Rate 9.51 2.61 6.86 0.56 
 
The most common injuries during the response were lacerations, sprains, and 
contusions (see Figure 7).89 The long-term health effects from Deepwater Horizon are 
still unclear. The Gulf long-term follow-up study was initiated by the National Institute of 
Environmental Health Sciences in June 2010 and is still ongoing. 
 
Figure 7.  Deepwater Horizon Most Common Injuries by Nature of Injury, 
April 23–July 8, 201090 
                                                 
88 Adapted from BP. “Deepwater Horizon Incident Response Recordable Injury & Illness Data.” 
89 CDC, “NIOSH Report of Deepwater Horizon Response/BP Illness and Injury Data,” 8. 
90 Adapted from CDC, “NIOSH Report of Deepwater Horizon Response/BP Illness and Injury Data,” 
Graph 3. 
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D. FATALITIES AMONG RESPONDERS IN DISASTERS 
Fortunately, research has shown that fatalities among disaster responders are 
uncommon and, unlike injury rates, the CFOI catalog of fatal workplace injuries provides 
extensive information on fatalities broken down by event. Few studies have been 
conducted on the correlation between responder fatalities and disaster response. 
However, a 2009 study published in the Journal of Disaster Medicine and Public Health 
Preparedness closely examined the CFOI data for natural disasters between 1992 and 
2006.91 The study found a total of 307 occupational fatalities among disaster responders, 
averaging approximately 20 fatal injuries per year. It is important to note that this study 
excluded terrorist events such as the WTC tragedy in calculating total fatalities, as the 
events drastically skewed average fatalities per year. Fatalities were most common during 
hurricanes, wildfires, and floods (see Figure 8).92 All but four of the fatalities were tied to 
either a particular hazardous condition caused by the disaster or to the particular type of 
work that was being performed. In 39 percent of the cases the cause of the fatality was 
tied primarily to a particular hazard, in 33 percent to the particular work of the responder, 
and in 27 percent to both factors.93 
The cause of the fatalities establishes that, during the study period, the 
predominant cause of death was either exposure to the disaster conditions or the actual 
disaster-related work. The primary cause of mortality during wildfires, for example, was 
exposure to fire.94 During flooding, the primary cause was drowning, primarily among 
responders in vehicles attempting to transverse flooded roadways to or from the 
incident.95 
                                                 
91 Gregory M. Fayard, “Fatal Work Injuries Involving Natural Disasters, 1992–2006,” Disaster 








Figure 8.  Occupational Fatalities among Natural Disaster Responders, 
1992–200696 
The study also found that government workers were far over-represented among 
deaths in disasters when compared to overall worker fatality rates (see Table 7). Between 
1992 and 2006, public sector employees made up about 10 percent of fatal work injuries; 
however, when reviewing deaths due to natural disasters during the same period, they 
comprised 31 percent of fatalities.97 The correlation is even more pronounced among 
federal employees, increasing five-fold from 3 percent to 16 percent.98 This drastic 
increase in mortality rates of public employees during disasters is an indicator of the 
increased risk the employees face during disaster operations. 
  
                                                 




Table 7.   Major Characteristics of Fatal Work Injuries Overall and for 
Natural Disasters, 1992–200699 
  
All Fatal Work 
Injuries 
All Natural 
Disasters Wildfires Hurricanes Floods 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 90,286 100 307 100 80 100 72 100 62 100 
Public (by sector) 9,122 10 95 31 47 59 15 21 20 32 
  Federal 2,506 3 49 16 32 40 6 8 5 8 
  State 1,737 2 19 6 9 11 - - 5 8 
  Local 4,759 5 25 8 6 8 6 8 10 16 
Protective Services 
(by Occupation) 4,218 5 73 24 51 64 5 7 12 19 
  Firefighting 681 1 59 19 51 64 - - 5 8 
  Law Enforcement 2,199 2 7 2 - - - - - - 
 
                                                 
99 Adapted from Fayard, “Fatal Work Injuries Involving Natural Disasters,” 204. 
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IV. INJURY ANALYSIS 
The nature of the problems across multiple disasters and years demonstrates 
continued failures when it comes to responder safety. For all four events analyzed in 
detail in this thesis, the rate of injury among responders was noticeably higher than that 
of both the general population and first responders in their day-to-day roles (see Figure 
9). Additionally, the most common injuries noted, lacerations, sprains, and contusions, 
were common among all of the noted disasters. 
 
Figure 9.  Injury Incidence Rate Comparison100 
GAO reports on both the WTC events and Hurricane Katrina have indicated 
continued systematic failures in integration and implementation of safety during disasters 
and have shown that, even when the needed resources are provided, enforcement and 
compliance among responders can remain low.101 The research has indicated that there 
are, for most cases, already sensible policies in place that should prevent injuries; it is the 
enforcement or implementation that results in unneeded injury. 
                                                 
100 Adapted from data collected and shown in prior figures. 
101 GAO, Disaster Preparedness; Bascetta, September 11. 
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For example, the Department of Homeland Security and its component FEMA 
established the National Response Framework, which, in cooperation with OSHA 
,includes the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex. The annex calls for hazard 
identification, environmental sampling, personal exposure monitoring, collecting and 
managing exposure data, development of site-specific safety plans, immunization and 
prophylaxis, and medical surveillance, medical monitoring, and psychological monitoring 
during a disaster.102 As is demonstrated in this chapter, these actions should provide 
substantial protection from responder injury in disasters, especially when coupled with 
existing federal, state, and local policies. However, enforcement is lacking. 
In fact, in disasters going back to at least the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
OSHA has temporarily suspended enforcement in specific areas to expedite 
recovery.103 OSHA instead relies on providing technical assistance to responders as an 
alternative to formal enforcement action.104 OSHA has asserted that this method 
provides the best balance in recovery since enforcement actions do not take effect until 
after the appeal process is over, which can drastically delay abatement.105 In most 
cases, however, employers forgo an appeal and resolve OSHA citations within fifteen 
days.106 
During Hurricane Sandy, records collected by OSHA indicate that federal 
inspectors in the New York metropolitan area noted thousands of instances of unsafe 
job conditions among responders, but in most cases only issued a warning to fix the 
problem.107 Reports indicate that the issues often went unfixed even after warnings, as 
                                                 
102 “Worker Safety and Health Support Annex,” FEMA, accessed February 10, 2017, 
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-support-wsh.pdf. 
103 David M. Newman, “Protecting Worker and Public Health during Responses to Catastrophic 
Disasters—learning from the World Trade Center Experience,” American Journal of Industrial Medicine 
57, no. 11 (2014): 1285–1298; Torres, “Legislators Question Enforcement Suspension After Disasters.” 
104 GAO, Disaster Preparedness. . 
105 Newman, “Protecting Worker and Public Health during Responses,” 1288 
106 Ibid. 
107 Erica Pearson and Greg B. Smith, “‘CANE, THEN DEATH & PAIN: Safety often Ignored in 
Cleanup Work Feds Find 1,000s of Violations but Issue Few Fines,” New York Daily News, April 28, 2013. 
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enforcement actions were rare.108 During Hurricane Sandy, OSHA issued only 32 
formal violations with only minimal fines between $1,000 and $11,600.109 
A. EXTENDED WORK HOURS 
Even when followed, OSHA standards fail to address extended work 
schedules.110 It is typical in a disaster recovery environment to see strenuous work 
schedules with few breaks. During the WTC recovery, twelve-hour shifts and seven-
day workweeks were normal among responders, resulting in prolonged periods of 
exposure to additional risk.111 A study into the health effects of Hurricane Katrina 
found that “given the high pace of the response and the resulting long hours for 
responders … mental and physical stressors were potentially significant influences on 
the health and well-being of responders.”112 
The long shifts are exacerbated by short sleep duration and erratic sleep 
patterns.113 Research has shown that when responders receive less than five hours of 
sleep per night, they experience a threefold increase in slips, trips, and falls, muscle 
strain, dehydration, and depression.114  
B. HAZARD CONTROL AND INJURY REDUCTION 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has identified that, in 
disasters, “managing [responder] safety is more accurately described as managing their 
level of risk.”115 Normal safety procedures, which many agencies have identified for day-
to-day operations, may not be practical in the early stages of disasters.116 Injury reduction 
                                                 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Newman, “Protecting Worker and Public Health during Responses,” 1285–1298, 1289. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Rusiecki et al., “Disaster-Related Exposures and Health Effects,” 820. 
113 Ibid., 830. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Houser et al., Emergency Responder Injuries and Fatalities. 
116 “Emergency Response Resources,” CDC, last updated December 2, 2016, 
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/emres/responders.html. 
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is accomplished by reducing the hazard to injury; traditionally there is a three-tiered 
hierarchy of control to assist in reducing or eliminating hazards. The first and generally 
most effective means is to control the hazard source (either by removing or reducing the 
hazard), the second is to use engineering controls in the physical environment to separate 
the worker from the hazard, and the third is to use personal protective equipment.117 
Controlling the hazard source is generally impractical during disasters. In 
manufacturing you might control a hazard by avoiding the use of toxic chemicals, 
removing tripping hazards, or using non-flammable materials. However, it is neither 
practical nor realistic to remove a hurricane, earthquake, or other disaster. In fact, in most 
cases it is the responders who will eventually be responsible for the removal of the effects 
of the disaster.  
It can also be impractical to implement control over the source of a hazard or to 
install engineered controls during the initial response to a disaster. Examples of 
engineering controls include isolating areas using handrails or blockades, utilizing 
ventilation systems, enclosing hazard sources, or using mechanical or automated options 
over manual methods.118 However, after twenty-four to seventy-two hours, the need for 
life-saving rescue operations caused by the disaster diminishes. Once rescue operations 
are over and there is no longer an immediate risk to lives, more effective hazard control 
can be put in place to provide protection to responders.119 For example, in the immediate 
aftermath of an earthquake, responders prioritize removing trapped survivors from 
buildings over installing permeant barriers around weakened areas in a building. 
Unlike controls over the source of a hazard or engineered controls, personal 
protective equipment (PPE) can be implemented at any time as long as the equipment is 
available. PPE works by providing a last line of defense for a responder, and includes 
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items such as gloves, respiratory protection, and steel-toe boots.120 Due to the importance 
of PPE, it is analyzed in depth in the next section. 
The two phases of a disaster are generally identified as response and recovery. 
During the initial response phase, the focus is usually to stop the immediate threat to life 
or property, and to reach trapped or injured survivors. During this phase, the risk analysis 
weighs heavily on saving the most lives in the limited amount of time available. The 
recovery phase can be much longer, lasting months or even years, and focuses on the 
restoration of the impacted area.121 During the recovery phase, the risk analysis shifts; 
the benefit is no longer saving lives, but getting the community back to its pre-disaster 
condition. This distinction is important because the level of acceptable risk to responders 
should be weighed against the potential benefit. It is important to adjust the risk analysis 
as response operations give way to recovery. Failing to do so can result in taking 
unnecessary risks with the safety of responders. For example, during the WTC recovery, 
the City of New York extended the rescue phase to include the entire nine months of 
debris removal.122 The mayor’s office was under considerable pressure to open more of 
the city for reoccupation, and the result was an attempt to return to normalcy rapidly; for 
many this meant de-emphasizing risk.123 For workers at the WTC, this extended 
designation created substantial obstacles to implementing safe work practices and 
enforcing safety regulations.124  
Establishing safety procedures and guidelines, and installing additional hazard 
control measures was seen as an impediment to the rescue of victims and the retrieval 
of body parts.125 In the case of the WTC, even though the last survivor was rescued 
less than twenty-four hours after the attack, this meant that training on proper 
respiratory use was delayed at least three weeks, and the establishment of a formal 
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safety program was delayed four weeks. In the first nine weeks after the WTC attack, 
almost 1,000 responders reported respiratory injuries; NIEHS investigators reviewing 
injury rates between September 14 and 25, 2001, noted that injury rates were “far 
above the national average.”126 
C. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
The provision of training and equipment before a disaster event has been 
identified numerous times as paramount to workers’ ability to efficiently and safely 
respond to disasters.127 Responders proceeding with missing or incomplete equipment 
can be placed in harm’s way, resulting in injuries or illness that will prevent them from 
continuing to perform their duties.  
During the WTC recovery, a CDC study indicated that respirator wear rates 
were as low as 21 percent among responders.128 The CDC believes that many of the 
respiratory problems could have been prevented if responders had used respirators 
while on site. Initially there was a limited supply of respirators for responders; 
however, even when they were made widely available to responders, use was rare due 
to a lack of training and proper fit-testing.129 Additionally, since respirators can be 
uncomfortable in physically demanding conditions, provision alone may not have been 
adequate. When responders are properly equipped and trained, discomfort and 
convenience have been identified as the two primary reasons for not using respiratory 
protection; prior studies have identified that supervision and enforcement are likely to 
increase compliance rates.130 
During Hurricane Katrina, similar issues arose with the availability and 
provision of PPE.131 The GAO found that the level of health and safety training and 
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equipment provided in the Gulf area fell well below established federal standards.132 
These conditions were exacerbated among certain responders, such as day laborers 
working debris removal who were often provided with no protective equipment even 
when the debris was determined to be toxic.133  
Responders working in the devastated regions flooded by Hurricane Sandy 
faced dangerous mold and asbestos contamination similar to both the WTC and 
Hurricane Katrina responses. Within the first month of response operations, OSHA 
agents working in Sandy-affected areas identified 17,481 instances of safety issues 
with responders.134 Of those instances, around 6,500 of the affected workers had to be 
removed from hazardous conditions, including some who lacked proper PPE.135 
D. TRAINING 
Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, the National Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences identified training as a major systems failure of both Hurricane Katrina and 
WTC responses.136 They noted that most resources are dedicated to just-in-time and 
short-term training, and that responder safety training is simply not prioritized outside 
of disasters.137 Studies have shown that just-in-time and on-site training does not 
adequately prepare responders to safely conduct themselves in a disaster 
environment.138 
Just-in-time training should focus on site-specific hazards and procedures, 
reinforcing existing training rather than attempting to cover everything in a short and 
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often overwhelming training session.139 Multiple studies have shown that a more 
comprehensive disaster-response training program is needed among all responders, 
including first responders and skilled support personnel.140 
E. MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
Early detection, intervention, and treatment of illness (both physical and 
mental) are paramount in responders and have been identified as needed action since at 
least the WTC response.141 However, past disaster responses have failed to address 
surveillance or tracking of responder exposure or injury. Following the WTC attack, it 
took almost seven weeks to establish a health and safety plan, and it was not until 
2002, at least three months after the recovery started, that the WTC Worker and 
Volunteer Medical Screening Program commenced.142 
The Worker Safety and Health Support Annex does require some limited medical 
surveillance. However, it only mandates monitoring when it is otherwise required by 
regulation (e.g., in environments with known asbestos and lead), and fails to provide a 
requirement for long-term epidemiological follow-up, instead only recommedning an 
evaluation of the possiblity.143 It is unclear why many of these provisions have not yet 
been fully implemented, but, as was idenfitied during Hurrican Katrina, funding and 
responsiblity appear to have a major impact.144 Additionally, the annex applies 
specifically to disasters, and the sporadic nature of funding for disaster response may 
prevent the establishment of procedures or systems to facilitate efficient medical 
surveillance during a disaster. 
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A review of occupational injury data from various disasters supports an increased 
injury rate among responders in all types of disasters studied. However, there is 
insufficient data to support a statistical sample across all events and occupations to prove 
causation; further study should be considered in this area. Nevertheless, given the 
analysis of past disasters and the apparent connection between injury rates and disasters, 
the following recommendations are made to reduce injury rates among responders: 
A. IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION 
First, this study has revealed that there is insufficient data collection on responder 
injury and illness during disasters to adequately conduct a root cause analysis and a 
comparison with existing policies. Only broad recommendations can be made based on a 
limited number of case studies. There is a need for increased data collection from the 
initial onset of disasters through long-term effects to provide a thorough set of baseline 
data for future research. Greater attention must also be placed on medical surveillance 
for responders in a disaster. Tracking and monitoring both risk and injury has been 
lackluster in every event studied for this research, except the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill. 
The best way to identify efficient means for improving injury rates is through 
specific targeted actions. Additional data collection and monitoring can allow future 
researchers to identify specific circumstances that increase risk, and work to develop 
either better practices or better protective devices for responders. However, without 
specific data, policymakers must continue to rely on general understanding and 
recommendations, which may not target the true nature of the problem. 
There are definite challenges to improved data collection, the greatest of which 
are authority and funding. While the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex does call 
for these items, there is no clear source for funding outside a disater, nor a clear 
resposbility within a federal agency to maintin these systems. Consider the World Trade 
Center Health Program, which preforms many of these tasks on a very limited scale; this 
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organization has faced repeated funding issues, and has often been a topic of media 
discussion when part or all of the program is defunded in the federal budget.145 A 
program for all disaters is likely to face similar funding issues, and may not have the 
political force that WTC-related measures often carry in Congress. 
B. ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING POLICIES 
This study has also revealed a need for increased enforcement of existing policies 
at all levels, especially relating to the use of PPE. The research demonstrated that PPE 
was paramount to workers’ ability to efficiently and safely respond to disasters; 
however, it also showed that its use was often overlooked or ignored.146 During all the 
events studied in this research, there were numerous examples of noncompliance with 
PPE rules and best practices. While in some cases a lack of compliance was initially 
caused by limited access to PPE, the compliance rates did not substantially improve 
after PPE was made available. 
OSHA’s technical assistance approach, when used in place of enforcement, has 
been ineffective. While there is certainly always benefit in collaboration, enforcement 
should be a priority. Safety standards should not be suspended or loosely enforced. 
Both regulatory agencies and responders’ immediate supervisors need to ensure 
compliance with safety procedures and take enforcement actions when procedures are 
not followed.  
Additionally, it was shown that PPE can be uncomfortable or inconvenient in 
physically demanding conditions, such as with respirators during the WTC 
response.147 While proper supervision and regulatory enforcement can increase 
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compliance and reduce injury, additional research in this area could lead to more 
effective and less restrictive equipment for use.  
Enforcement of existing policies appears to be one of the easiest 
recommendations. While it is possible that it will result in some initial resistance from 
responders or agencies not used to the enforcement, the legal framework and funding 
is already in place. 
C. IMPROVED RISK SURVEILLANCE 
Response agencies should know where their resources and risks are. Gathering 
hazard information and resource locations prior to initial physical access to the site can 
reduce risk to responders by allowing agencies to better prepare for initial 
deployments.  
A review of the data available at the time of the WTC attack revealed that, had 
agencies accessed the Toxic Release Inventory during the initial onset of the disaster, 
agencies would have been aware of the presence of tetrachloroethylene, PCBs, arsenic, 
and other toxic raw materials, and therefore been able to better prepare responders for 
the risks.148 In the future, data on facilities and locations that might present safety and 
health risks for responders in a disaster will be key in administering a safety 
management program.  
Proper monitoring of risk is essential in identifying and choosing proper 
methods for reducing injury, whether through engineering controls or PPE. Without 
adequate surveillance of injuries, it is impossible to identify causation of repetitive 
injuries in a disaster, or to make the data available for further study. 
Improved risk surveillance may run into some of the same funding issues as 
medical surveillance. Funding and systems need to be put in place to track the data. 
However, unlike medical surveillance, the level of skill and the number of people that 
need to be involved are sustainably lower. Improved risk surveillance relies on central 
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reporting of high-risk possibilities, such as high-risk chemical stores, which many 
localities already track.  
D. PROPER STAFFING 
Response organizations must ensure that adequate personnel are deployed to an 
event to accomplish the response and recovery objectives without sacrificing responder 
rest time. The research demonstrated that responders are often expected to work extended 
hours in high pace-environments, and as a result have inadequate periods of rest that lead 
increased risk of injury and decreased efficiency.149 
In events where existing personnel are likely to be insufficient to meet response 
or recovery objectives, it is imperative to coordinate with partner organizations to 
ensure that adequate personnel are sent to mutual aid efforts. Many response 
organizations already have mutual aid agreements or memorandum of understanding 
with other organizations to provide assistance when needed.  
There may be some impediments to implementation associated with cost. 
However, some of the financial implications will be countered by a reduction of 
overtime that must be paid to responders. In large events, there may also be difficulties 
with staffing availability in the local area; the associated travel time may require a 
short period of inadequete staffing while waiting for additional resources. 
E. IMPROVED TRAINING FOR SKILLED SUPPORT PERSONNEL 
Lastly, in order to effectively respond during a disaster, agencies must address 
issues concerning safety equipment and bolster both on-site training and pre-incident 
training for responders.150 Past events have shown that just-in-time training should not 
be used in place of training before an incident, and doing so may leave workers 
inadequately prepared to respond. Training should not only cover worker safety but 
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also worker rights to safety, so that responder know when to speak up regarding safety 
issues that could endanger their, or their coworkers’, well-being.151 
First response agencies already provide this training to their employees; 
however, the same is not necessarily true for skilled support personnel.152 Responders 
should be coached in various requirements before deploying to a disaster area. Most 
importantly, there should be minimum standards for training all responders before they 
are deployed to a disaster response operation. Such training should ensure that 
common terminology is used for safety and health issues as well as the relevant 
protective equipment and decontamination and rehabilitation processes.   
The primary limitation for increased training, as with many of the other 
recommendations, is funding. In order to institute additional pre-disaster training, staff 
time and resources must be diverted from other efforts. However, there are existing 
sources for local responders to find funding for training, such as FEMA’s Homeland 
Security National Training Program and Continuing Training Grants, among other grant 
programs.153 
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